No. of Printed Pages : 3 REC–102/REC-002 Ph. D. (ECONOMICS) (PHDEC) Term-End Examination December, 2023 REC-102/REC-002 : ECONOMIC THEORY Time : 3 Hours Maximum Marks : 100

Note: Answer questions from each Section as directed.

Section-A

Note : Answer any two questions from this Section.

2×20=40

1. Consider the utility function $u = x_1^{\alpha} x_2^{\beta}$. Let the prices be p_1 and p_2 and income be m.

Derive the :

- (i) Hicksian demand function
- (ii) Indirect utility function
- 2. Explain Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Stating the assumptions, sketch a proof for the same.

3. Differentiate between a static game of incomplete information and a dynamic game of incomplete information. Discuss the structure of both the types of games and the relevant equilibrium concept of each.

[2]

4. Discuss the overlapping generations model.

Section-B

Note : Answer any five questions from this Section.

 $5 \times 12 = 60$

- Explain the concept of a social welfare function.
 Compare the Bergson social welfare function with that of the Arrow social welfare function.
- 6. Discuss decision-making by an economic agent in an environment of uncertainty. Bring out the difference of decision-making under uncertainty with that under certainty.
- Explain Walras' law. Give a simple proof of the existence of general equilibrium under exchange.

- 9. Explain the following :
 - (i) Expenditure function
 - (ii) Shepard's lemma
- 10. Explain the concept of adverse selection. How does it differ from moral hazard ? Show how equilibrium may be sub-optimal in situation of adverse selection, and of moral hazard.
- 11. What is meant by a cooperative game ? Discuss the concepts of (i) characteristic function and (ii) the core.
- Discuss pricing under monopoly. Explain the first-, second- and third-degree price discrimination.

REC-102/REC-002